Publications

Forthcoming

21. ‘How and How Not to Take on Brueckner’s Sceptic.’ The Philosophical Quarterly. (link)
20. ‘In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: a Reply to Casalegno.’ (with I. Douven). Dialectica.
19. ‘Proper Bootstrapping.’ (with I. Douven). Synthese.
18. ‘Tegen Scepticisme over de Waarde van Kennis.’ Tijdschrift voor Filosofie.
17. ‘A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts.’ European Journal of Philosophy. (link)
16. ‘Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology.’ Erkenntnis. (link)

2012

15. ‘Do “Contextualist Cases” Support Contextualism?’ Erkenntnis 76, 115-20. (link)

2011

14. ‘Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics.’ (with I. Douven). Erkenntnis 75, 271-83. (link)
13. ‘Not Without Justification.’ Dialectica 65, 581-95. (link)
12. ‘What’s the Point of “Knowledge” Anyway?’ Episteme 8, 53-66. (link)
11. ‘A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge.’ Philosophical Studies 152, 287-92. (link)
10. ‘Sustaining a Rational Disagreement.’ (with I. Douven). DeRegt, H. et. al. eds. EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Dordrecht: Springer, 101-110.
9. ‘In Defence of Virtue Epistemology.’ Synthese 179, 409-33. (link)

2010

8. ‘Second-order Knowledge.’ (with N. Pedersen). Bernecker, S. and Pritchard, D. eds. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. London: Routledge, 586-96. (link)

2009

7. ‘Knowledge and Safety.’ Journal of Philosophical Research 34, 21-31. (link)
6. ‘Pritchard on Knowledge, Safety, and Cognitive Achievements.’ Journal of Philosophical Research 34, 51-53. (link)
5. ‘Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning.’ (with D. Pritchard). Salerno, J. ed. New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford: OUP, 324-38. (link)
4. ‘Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology.’ International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17, 583-87. (link)
3. ‘Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. By Jennifer Lackey.’ The Philosophical Quarterly 59, 748-50. (link)
2. ‘Standards zur Bewertung von Architektur: Ein Funktionsbasierter Ansatz.’ Kelp, C. & Zamp Kelp, G. Eine Suche nach dem vibrierenden Nerv unserer Zeit. Berlin: UdK Buchshop.

2008

1. ‘Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy 46, 221-44. (link)