Christoph Kelp

Bank Cases and the Contextualism/Invariantism Debate
Abstract. This paper raises four worries for attributor contextualist theories of knowledge attributions (AC), or to be more precise, to versions of AC that are motivated by the likes of the so-called “Bank cases”. The first concerns the plausibility of the underlying methodological thesis, the second is that AC itself fails to live up to the demands of this methodology, the third uses the second to suggest that invariantism offers more unified theory than AC and so may turn out to be preferable on theoretical grounds, while, according to the fourth, invariantism but not contextualism can accommodate a plausible version of the methodological thesis.

What’s So Good about Knowledge
Abstract. This paper offers a novel account of the value of knowledge. The account is novel insofar as it advocates a shift in focus from the value of individual items of knowledge to the value of the commodity of knowledge. It is argued that the commodity of knowledge is valuable in at least two ways: (i) in a wide range of areas, knowledge is our way of being in cognitive contact with the world and (ii) for agents the good life is a life rich enough in knowledge.

Towards A Knowledge-Based Account of Understanding
Abstract. Recent epistemology has witnessed a surge of interest in the nature of understanding. One crucial question here is whether understanding is, in some sense to be specified, factive. Among defenders of the factivity of understanding, there is a controversy over whether understanding can be analysed in terms of knowledge. The aim of this paper is to provide a novel knowledge-based account of understanding and to argue that this account is preferable at least to the most prominent non-knowledge based accounts of understanding in recent literature.

How To Motivate Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology
Duncan Pritchard has recently defended an account of knowledge that combines an anti-luck condition with an ability condition on knowledge. In order to explain this hybrid structure of knowledge he appeals to Edward Craig’s genealogical account of the concept of knowledge. This paper argues that Pritchard’s envisaged explanation fails and offers a better alternative.

Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology
This paper aims to develop a virtue epistemological account of knowledge and justified belief that unlike its traditional cousins falls within the paradigm of knowledge first epistemology. It is argued that the account presented (i) satisfies a number of plausible principle for knowledge and justified belief, including that knowledge entails justified belief, that it is compatible with plausible closure principles for knowledge and justification, (ii) solves a number of core problems pertaining to knowledge and justified belief such as the new evil demon problem and the Gettier problem and (iii) compares favourably with alternative knowledge first accounts of justified belief and knowledge.