EVIDENCE: KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (with A. Meylan Co-PI)
Funding
This project is funded by a resesarch grant from the Swiss National Foundation (approx. CHF 620,000)
Project Description
The study of knowledge and understanding has a very rich tradition in philosophy that dates back to the works of Plato and Aristotle. The reason for this is that both these notions denote particularly valuable cognitive standings whose natures raise fundamental questions concerning the type of access to reality rational subjects such as ourselves enjoy. The goal of the project “Evidence: Knowledge and Understanding” is to explore a novel and unified account of the way knowledge, understanding and evidence relate to each other. While both knowledge and understanding appear to be of great value to us, we may indeed ask whether gaining an understanding of what we know, as opposed to what we correctly believe for instance, is of particular importance. The reason to think it is, according to one of the main hypotheses that we intend to explore, is that the understanding we gain of what we know contributes to the important role our evidence plays.
Consider for instance the occurrence of a thunderclap which is evidence for the claim that lightning struck. When learning that a thunderclap has occurred, one acquires evidence for believing that lightning struck and the role this piece of evidence can play plausibly depends on the understanding one has of why a thunderclap has occurred and of the occurrence of thunderclaps in general. One’s readiness to offer it as evidence for the claim that lightning struck depends on that understanding.
The project “Evidence: Knowledge and Understanding” is structured around two subprojects, each of which is itself subdivided in three distinct parts. Subproject A, entitled “Evidence and Understanding”, will investigate the hypothesis that the understanding we gain of what we know contributes to the role our evidence plays. According to the default epistemological view, the evidence we acquire is what puts us in a position to know and to understand certain things. As a matter of fact, inquiry presumably aims at reaching valuable cognitive standings such as knowledge and understanding and we achieve this aim by gathering evidence for the claims that are considered in the course of an inquiry. As a result, considerable attention has been devoted to the question as to how the evidence we acquire can put us in a position to know reality and to understand the reality we come to know. Subproject A will reverse the order of questions by investigating whether what we come to know and understand contributes to our stock of evidence and to the role it plays in the course of inquiry.
Subproject B, entitled “Knowledge and Understanding” will explore three aspects of the current debate concerning the epistemology of understanding with the aim of making explicit the reasons for thinking that understanding is best conceived of as a body of comprehensive and well-connected knowledge. This subproject draws on the debates concerning the factivity of understanding, its grasping component and its compatibility with epistemic luck to examine three main hypotheses which, if correct, lay ground for a specific knowledge-based conception of understanding. We intend to show that such a knowledge-based conception is best suited to account for the particular contribution of understanding to the role played by evidence (the particular contribution of understanding to the role played by evidence is, to recall, the topic explored in subproject A). For, given such an account of understanding, this contribution is naturally conceived in terms of the way individually known propositions fit into a larger body of comprehensive and well-connected knowledge.
By pursuing these two research aims simultaneously, the project “Evidence: Knowledge and Understanding” thus aims at offering a novel account of the way knowledge, understanding and evidence relate to each other. This account will clarify the important conceptual relations between these notions and show how the knowledge and the understanding we gain themselves contribute to an objective inquiry into reality.
Funding
This project is funded by a resesarch grant from the Swiss National Foundation (approx. CHF 620,000)
Project Description
The study of knowledge and understanding has a very rich tradition in philosophy that dates back to the works of Plato and Aristotle. The reason for this is that both these notions denote particularly valuable cognitive standings whose natures raise fundamental questions concerning the type of access to reality rational subjects such as ourselves enjoy. The goal of the project “Evidence: Knowledge and Understanding” is to explore a novel and unified account of the way knowledge, understanding and evidence relate to each other. While both knowledge and understanding appear to be of great value to us, we may indeed ask whether gaining an understanding of what we know, as opposed to what we correctly believe for instance, is of particular importance. The reason to think it is, according to one of the main hypotheses that we intend to explore, is that the understanding we gain of what we know contributes to the important role our evidence plays.
Consider for instance the occurrence of a thunderclap which is evidence for the claim that lightning struck. When learning that a thunderclap has occurred, one acquires evidence for believing that lightning struck and the role this piece of evidence can play plausibly depends on the understanding one has of why a thunderclap has occurred and of the occurrence of thunderclaps in general. One’s readiness to offer it as evidence for the claim that lightning struck depends on that understanding.
The project “Evidence: Knowledge and Understanding” is structured around two subprojects, each of which is itself subdivided in three distinct parts. Subproject A, entitled “Evidence and Understanding”, will investigate the hypothesis that the understanding we gain of what we know contributes to the role our evidence plays. According to the default epistemological view, the evidence we acquire is what puts us in a position to know and to understand certain things. As a matter of fact, inquiry presumably aims at reaching valuable cognitive standings such as knowledge and understanding and we achieve this aim by gathering evidence for the claims that are considered in the course of an inquiry. As a result, considerable attention has been devoted to the question as to how the evidence we acquire can put us in a position to know reality and to understand the reality we come to know. Subproject A will reverse the order of questions by investigating whether what we come to know and understand contributes to our stock of evidence and to the role it plays in the course of inquiry.
Subproject B, entitled “Knowledge and Understanding” will explore three aspects of the current debate concerning the epistemology of understanding with the aim of making explicit the reasons for thinking that understanding is best conceived of as a body of comprehensive and well-connected knowledge. This subproject draws on the debates concerning the factivity of understanding, its grasping component and its compatibility with epistemic luck to examine three main hypotheses which, if correct, lay ground for a specific knowledge-based conception of understanding. We intend to show that such a knowledge-based conception is best suited to account for the particular contribution of understanding to the role played by evidence (the particular contribution of understanding to the role played by evidence is, to recall, the topic explored in subproject A). For, given such an account of understanding, this contribution is naturally conceived in terms of the way individually known propositions fit into a larger body of comprehensive and well-connected knowledge.
By pursuing these two research aims simultaneously, the project “Evidence: Knowledge and Understanding” thus aims at offering a novel account of the way knowledge, understanding and evidence relate to each other. This account will clarify the important conceptual relations between these notions and show how the knowledge and the understanding we gain themselves contribute to an objective inquiry into reality.
DIMENSIONS OF WELLBEING (with M. Simion Co-PI)
Funding
This project is funded by a research grant from the Therme Group (approx. GBP 330,000).
Project Description
This project develops an integrated account of the nature of wellbeing along several dimensions, i.e. cognitive, emotional, social and physical wellbeing, in a way that is informed by work in contemporary applied ehtics, epistemology, philosophy of emotions, philosophy of psychologiy, philosophy of medicine and philosophy of biology. It also connects research in the philosophy of wellbeing with research in psychology and human enhancement in a way that adequately grounds each form of enhancement in the kind of normativity that is distinctive to it (i.e. cognitive, emotional, social and biological).
Funding
This project is funded by a research grant from the Therme Group (approx. GBP 330,000).
Project Description
This project develops an integrated account of the nature of wellbeing along several dimensions, i.e. cognitive, emotional, social and physical wellbeing, in a way that is informed by work in contemporary applied ehtics, epistemology, philosophy of emotions, philosophy of psychologiy, philosophy of medicine and philosophy of biology. It also connects research in the philosophy of wellbeing with research in psychology and human enhancement in a way that adequately grounds each form of enhancement in the kind of normativity that is distinctive to it (i.e. cognitive, emotional, social and biological).
A VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TRUST (with A. Carter (PI) and M. Simion)
Funding
This project is funded by a research grant from the Leverhulme Trust (approx. GBP 250,000).
Project Description
One of the most serious challenges faced by philosophers of trust is to understand why, and under what circumstances, we should trust as opposed to distrust others and what they tell us. Even though philosophical theories of trust have offered insights into what trust is, they have yet to tell us what qualities make someone a good or bad truster, and how they do so. This project introduces virtue epistemology to address this issue for the first time. It offers a novel method for theorising about what dispositions trusting well requires, and it uses this method to explain why certain forms of skilled trusting are more valuable than others.
Funding
This project is funded by a research grant from the Leverhulme Trust (approx. GBP 250,000).
Project Description
One of the most serious challenges faced by philosophers of trust is to understand why, and under what circumstances, we should trust as opposed to distrust others and what they tell us. Even though philosophical theories of trust have offered insights into what trust is, they have yet to tell us what qualities make someone a good or bad truster, and how they do so. This project introduces virtue epistemology to address this issue for the first time. It offers a novel method for theorising about what dispositions trusting well requires, and it uses this method to explain why certain forms of skilled trusting are more valuable than others.
INQUIRY, KNOWLEDGE, AND UNDERSTANDING
Project Description
The central thesis of this project is to view epistemology as the theory of inquiry. I argue that the resulting this thesis allows us to offer novel and promising approaches to a range of old epistemological issues, including (i) the nature of core epistemic phenomena as well as (ii) their value and (iii) the extent to which we possess them. The core epistemological phenomena that take centre stage in this project are knowledge and understanding. However, the project also broaches upon a variety of further relevant epistemic phenomena, most notably epistemic abilities, and epistemic sources such as deduction.
Project Description
The central thesis of this project is to view epistemology as the theory of inquiry. I argue that the resulting this thesis allows us to offer novel and promising approaches to a range of old epistemological issues, including (i) the nature of core epistemic phenomena as well as (ii) their value and (iii) the extent to which we possess them. The core epistemological phenomena that take centre stage in this project are knowledge and understanding. However, the project also broaches upon a variety of further relevant epistemic phenomena, most notably epistemic abilities, and epistemic sources such as deduction.
KNOWLEDGE FIRST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY
Funding
This project was funded by research grants from KU Leuven and Research Foundation Flanders (together approx. EUR 500,000).
Project Description
Knowledge and justified belief are among the most central notions in epistemology. While it is nearly universally agreed that knowledge entails justified belief, there is an ongoing debate over how, if at all, the two notions can be defined. Traditional epistemology takes justified belief to be the more fundamental of the two notions and ventures to define knowledge in terms of justified belief. One of the most promising accounts of justified belief that has been developed within the traditional framework is virtue epistemology, which analyses justified belief as belief that is the product of an epistemic ability, i.e. an ability to form true beliefs. An alternative to traditional epistemology that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent years is knowledge first epistemology. In contrast with its traditional cousin, knowledge first epistemology does not aim to define knowledge in terms of justified belief. Instead, it reverses the direction of analysis and ventures to define justified belief in terms of knowledge.
This project aims to develop a novel account of justified belief, which combines virtue epistemology with knowledge first epistemology. It is virtue epistemological in that it ventures to analyse justified belief in terms of epistemic ability. It is knowledge first epistemological in that, unlike traditional virtue epistemology, it does not unpack the notion of an epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know, thus offering a definition of justified belief in terms of knowledge. Two further goals of the project are to show (i) that this account offers promising solutions to a number of central problems in epistemology, including Gettier cases, the lottery paradox, the new evil demon problem and clairvoyant cases and (ii) that it therefore compares favourably with both its traditional virtue epistemological and other knowledge first epistemological rivals all of which fail to provide satisfactory solutions to at least some of these problems.
Funding
This project was funded by research grants from KU Leuven and Research Foundation Flanders (together approx. EUR 500,000).
Project Description
Knowledge and justified belief are among the most central notions in epistemology. While it is nearly universally agreed that knowledge entails justified belief, there is an ongoing debate over how, if at all, the two notions can be defined. Traditional epistemology takes justified belief to be the more fundamental of the two notions and ventures to define knowledge in terms of justified belief. One of the most promising accounts of justified belief that has been developed within the traditional framework is virtue epistemology, which analyses justified belief as belief that is the product of an epistemic ability, i.e. an ability to form true beliefs. An alternative to traditional epistemology that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent years is knowledge first epistemology. In contrast with its traditional cousin, knowledge first epistemology does not aim to define knowledge in terms of justified belief. Instead, it reverses the direction of analysis and ventures to define justified belief in terms of knowledge.
This project aims to develop a novel account of justified belief, which combines virtue epistemology with knowledge first epistemology. It is virtue epistemological in that it ventures to analyse justified belief in terms of epistemic ability. It is knowledge first epistemological in that, unlike traditional virtue epistemology, it does not unpack the notion of an epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know, thus offering a definition of justified belief in terms of knowledge. Two further goals of the project are to show (i) that this account offers promising solutions to a number of central problems in epistemology, including Gettier cases, the lottery paradox, the new evil demon problem and clairvoyant cases and (ii) that it therefore compares favourably with both its traditional virtue epistemological and other knowledge first epistemological rivals all of which fail to provide satisfactory solutions to at least some of these problems.