Books
  • Forthcoming. Knowledge and Artificial Intelligence. (with M. Simion). Cambridge University Press.
  • Forthcoming. Knowledge and Conceptual Engineering: The Epistemology, Ethics, and Politics of Meaning Production. (with M. Simion). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 2023. The Nature and Normativity of Defeat. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • 2021. Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion. (with M Simion). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • 2021. Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 2018. Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
Edited Books
  • 2020. Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. (with J. Greco). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Book Chapters
  • Forthcoming. Information, Misinformation, Disinformation: A Knowledge-First Account (with M. Simon). Popa-Wyatt, M. ed. Mis/Disinformation and Other Epistemic Pathologies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • ​Group Evidence, Group Belief, and Group Responsibility Transmission (with M. Simion and G. Pettigrove). McCain, K.  Stapleford, S., and  Steup, M.. Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. London and New York: Routledge.
  • 2026. Inquiry and Normative Defeat. (with M. Simion). Matheson, J. and Creller, A. Inquiry: Philosophical Perspectives. London and New York: Routledge. 
  • 2025. Agent Functionalism. Sylvan, K. et al. eds. A Companion to Epistemology, 3rd Edition. Wiley Blackwell.​
  • 2025. A Social Epistemology of Assertion. (with M. Simion) Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. eds. The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 2024. Aesthetic Disagreement, Aesthetic Testimony, and Defeat (with M. Simion). Silva Filho, W. ed. Epistemology of Conversation. Dordrecht: Springer.
  • 2023. Dogma, Defeat, and Closure. Pritchard, D. and Jope, M. eds. New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.
  • 2022. On Behalf of Knowledge-First Collective Epistemology (with. A. Carter and M. Simion). Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. eds.  Propositional and Doxastic Justification. NewYork: Routledge.
  • 2020. 'The Lottery, the Preface, and Epistemic Rule-Consequentialism.' (with F. Praolini). Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief. Essays of the Lottery Paradox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [pdf]
  • 2020. 'Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View.' (with M. Simion). Goldberg, S. ed. The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [link, pdf]
  • 2020. 'Introduction: Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology. Kelp, C. and Greco, J. eds. Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [pdf]
  • 2020. 'Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content.' (with C. Boult, J. Schnurr and M. Simion). Kelp, C. and Greco, J. eds. Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [pdf]
  • 2019. 'The Status of Reflection in Virtue Epistemology.' Silva, W. ed. Thinking about Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology. Dordrecht: Springer.
  • 2019. 'Utopie und Funktion.' Zamp Kelp, G. and Engel, L. eds. Luftschlosser: Ein Blick auf Haus-Rucker-Co/Post-Haus-Rucker. Leipzig: Spector. [pdf]
  • 2017. 'Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.' Carter, A., Gordon, E. and Jarvis, B. eds. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [pdf]
  • 2017. 'Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues.' Mi, C., Slote, M. and Sosa, E. eds. Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy. London: Routledge. [pdf]
  • 2017. 'Towards a Knowledge-Based Account of Understanding.' Grimm, S., Baumberger, C. and Ammon, S. eds. Explaining Understanding: New Essays in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge. [pdf]
  • 2014. 'Knowledge, Understanding, and Virtue.' Fairweather, A. ed. Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library. Dordrecht: Springer, 347-60. [link, pdf]
  • 2011. 'Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics.' (with I. Douven). Erkenntnis (Special Issue: Belief Revision Aiming at Truth 75, 271-83. [link, pdf]
  • 2011. 'Sustaining a Rational Disagreement.' (with I. Douven). DeRegt, H. et. al. eds. EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Dordrecht: Springer, 101-110. [pdf]
  • 2011. 'Second-order Knowledge.' (with N. Pedersen). Bernecker, S. and Pritchard, D. eds. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. London: Routledge, 586-96. [pdf]
  • 2009. 'Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning.' (with D. Pritchard). Salerno, J. ed. New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford: OUP, 324-38. [pdf]
  • 2009. 'Standards zur Bewertung von Architektur: Ein Funktionsbasierter Ansatz.' Kelp, C. & Zamp Kelp, G. Eine Suche nach dem vibrierenden Nerv unserer Zeit. Berlin: UdK Buchshop.
  • Information, Misinformation, Disinformation: A Knowledge-First Account (with M. Simon). Popa-Wyatt, M. ed. Mis/Disinformation and Other Epistemic Pathologies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Group Evidence, Group Belief, and Group Responsibility Transmission (with M. Simion and G. Pettigrove). McCain, K.  Stapleford, S., and  Steup, M.. Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. London and New York: Routledge.
Book Reviews
  • 2012. 'How and How Not to Take on Brueckner's Sceptic.' The Philosophical Quarterly 62: 386-91. [link, pdf]
  • 2009. 'Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. By Jennifer Lackey.' The Philosophical Quarterly 59, 748-50. [link, pdf]
Journal Articles
  • Knowledge and Practical Risk. Forthcoming in Episteme. [pdf]
  • 2025. What is Information? (with M. Simion). Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 99, 189–208 .
  • 2025. Trustworthy AI: Responses to Commentators (with M. Simion). Asian Journal of Philosophy 4, 3.
  • 2024. Closure and the Structure of Justification (with M. Jope). Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02245-0
  • ​2023. Linguistic Innovation for Gender Terms. (with M. Simion). Inquiry,1-21 https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2222155
  • 2023. How to be a Capacitist. Synthese 201, 169 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04143-0 
  • 2023. What is Trustworthiness? (with M. Simion). in Noûs 57, 667-83. [link]
  • 2023. Trustworthy AI. (with M. Simion) Asian Journal of Philosophy 2, 8.
  • 2022. Defeat and Proficiencies. Philosophical Issues 32, 82-103. [pdf]
  • 2022. How to Be an Infallibilist. (with M. Simion and A. Carter). Philosophical Studies 179, 2675-82. [link]
  • 2021. 'Theory of Inquiry.' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103, 359-84. [link, pdf]
  • 2021. 'Inquiry, Knowledge and Understanding.' Synthese 198, 1583-93 (Special Issue: Knowledge and Justification: New Directions). [link]
  • 2020. 'Conceptual Innovation, Function First.' (with M. Simion). Noûs 54, 985-1002. [link, pdf]
  • 2020. 'The Knowledge Norm of Blaming.' Analysis 20, 256-61. [link, pdf]
  • 2020. 'Hoops and Barns: A New Dilemma for Sosa.' (with. C. Boult, F. Broncano-Berrocal, P.Dimmock, H. Ghijsen and M. Simion). Synthese 197, 5187-5202 (Special Issue: The Epistemology of Ernest Sosa). [link, pdf]
  • 2020. 'The Epistemology of Ernest Sosa: an Introduction.' Synthese 197, 5903-5100 (Special Issue: The Epistemology of Ernest Sosa). [link]
  • 2020. 'Internalism, Phenomenal Conservatism, and Defeat.' Philosophical Issues 30, 192-204. [pdf]
  • 2020. 'Moral Assertion.' Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23, 639-49. [link, pdf]
  • 2020. 'How to Be an Anti-Reductionist.' (with M. Simion). Synthese 197, 2849-66. [link]
  • 2020. 'The C Account of Assertion: a Negative Result.' (with M. Simion). Synthese 197, 125-37. [link, pdf]
  • 2019. 'Inquiry and the Transmission of Knowledge.' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99, 298-310. [link, pdf] Winner of the 2017 Young Epistemologist Prize  
  • 2019. 'How to Be a Reliabilist.' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98, 346-74. [link, pdf]
  • 2018. 'Assertion: A Function First Account.' Noûs 52, 411-42. [link, pdf]
  • 2017. 'Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion.' (with M. Simion). Journal of Philosophy 114, 76-93. [link, pdf]
  • 2017. 'Commodious Knowledge.' (with M. Simion). Synthese 194 (Special Issue: Truth and Epistemic Norms), 1487-1502. [link, pdf]
  • 2017. 'Lotteries and Justification.' Synthese 194, 1233-1244. [link, pdf]
  • 2016. 'Norms of Belief.' (with M. Simion and H. Ghijsen). Philosophical Issues 16, 374-92. [link, pdf]
  • 2016. 'Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style.' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93, 79-100. [link, pdf]
  • 2016. 'The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge.' (with M. Simion). American Philosophical Quarterly 53, 397-409. [link, pdf]
  • 2016. 'Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited.' American Philosophical Quarterly 53, 27-37. [link, pdf]
  • 2015. 'Sosa on Assertion, Knowledge and Value.' Erkenntnis 80, 229-37. [link, pdf]
  • 2015. 'Understanding Phenomena.' Synthese 192 (Special Issue: Understanding through Modeling), 3799-3816. [link, pdf]
  • 2014. 'Unreflective Epistemology.' Episteme 11, 411-22. [link, pdf]
  • 2014. 'Epistemology Extended.' Philosophical Issues 24, 230-52. [link, pdf]
  • 2014. 'Knowledge and Approximate Knowledge.' (with L. Decock, I. Douven and S. Wenmackers). Erkenntnis 78 (Special Issue: The 9th Formal Epistemology Workshop), 1129-50. [link, pdf]
  • 2014. 'Two for the Knowledge Goal of Inquiry.' American Philosophical Quarterly 51, 227-32. [link, pdf]
  • 2014. 'No Justification for Lottery Losers.' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95, 205-17. [link, pdf]
  • 2014. 'Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen.' Erkenntnis 79, 729-32. [link, pdf]
  • 2013. 'A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts.' European Journal of Philosophy 21, 367-83. [link, pdf]
  • 2013. 'Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91, 265-78. [link, pdf]
  • 2013. 'Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology.' Erkenntnis 78, 245-52. [link, pdf]
  • 2013. 'How To Motivate Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.' Grazer Philosophische Studien 88, 211-25. [link, pdf]
  • 2013. 'Proper Bootstrapping.' (with I. Douven). Synthese 190 (Special Issue: The Formal Epistemology Project), 171-85. [link, pdf]
  • 2012. 'In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: a Reply to Casalegno.' (with I. Douven). dialectica (Special Issue: Paolo Casalegno's Good Points) 66, 289-97. [link]
  • 2012. 'Tegen Scepticisme over de Waarde van Kennis.' Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 74, 513-21. [link]
  • 2012. 'Do "Contextualist Cases" Support Contextualism?' Erkenntnis 76, 115-20. [link, pdf]
  • 2011. 'Not Without Justification.' dialectica (Special Issue: Justification) 65, 581-95. [link, pdf]
  • 2011. 'What’s the Point of “Knowledge” Anyway?' Episteme 8, 53-66. [link, pdf]
  • 2011. 'A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge.' Philosophical Studies 152, 287-92. [link, pdf]
  • 2011. 'In Defence of Virtue Epistemology.' Synthese 179, 409-33. [link, pdf]
  • 2009. 'Knowledge and Safety.' Journal of Philosophical Research 34 (Symposium: Safety-Based Epistemology), 21-31. [link, pdf]
  • 2009. 'Pritchard on Knowledge, Safety, and Cognitive Achievements.' Journal of Philosophical Research 34 (Symposium: Safety-Based Epistemology), 51-53. [link, pdf]
  • 2009. 'Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology.' International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17, 583-87. [link, pdf]
  • 2008. 'Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.' The Southern Journal of Philosophy 46, 221-44. [link, pdf]